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1. The history of Afghan language study 
 
The pioneer Western investigator of the languages of Afghanistan, Georg Morgenstierne, who 
began his work in 1924, called Afghanistan linguistically “one of the most interesting countries 
on earth.” Linguistic work by local scholars began in the following generation. When one of us 
[Spooner] first met Dr. A. G. Ravan Farhadi (the author of Le Persan Parlé en Afghanistan, 
1953) in Kabul in 1972, he announced that in the latest count the number of languages known in 
Afghanistan had reached 48. 
 
Any study of the languages of Afghanistan must take into account a number of factors relating 
not only to the geography of the territory itself, and the historical composition of Afghan society 
today, but also to the way our knowledge of it has developed since the beginning of the 19th 
century. These factors tend not only to color but to distort any efforts to explain what is going on 
today. Our modern Western study of Afghanistan began with the formal visit of Mountstuart 
Elphinstone on behalf of the British East India Company to the then Afghan Shah, Shah Shoja, in 
Peshawar (now Pakistan) in 1809. The British interest had been awakened by rumors of a 
possible collaboration between Napoleon and the Russian Czar (Alexander I) to invade India 
from the northwest—the only feasible land entry to the Subcontinent. The British invaded 
Afghanistan in 1839, via the Bolan Pass and Quetta, and despite significant and heavy reverses 
in two Afghan wars dominated the government of Afghanistan from then until 1919 formally 
(though “indirectly,” i.e. without attempting to install any administrative apparatus), and 
informally until the British withdrawal from South Asia in 1947. During this period of over a 
hundred years Afghanistan became relatively isolated from the rest of the Islamic world, and 
barely saw any of the other wider contacts that formally administered territories such as India 
enjoyed during the colonial period. However, because of the strategic value of the frontier with 
Russia British agents and travellers compiled a rich library of material concerning the 
contemporary history and culture of Afghanistan, including the part that became British 
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province, and is part of Pakistan. A few scholars from 
other European countries, especially Germany, contributed to this endeavour.  
 
Although a number of prescriptive grammars of Persian and Pashto appeared in the 19th century, 
the systematic study of the languages of the area was launched byMorgenstierne with a series of 
publications, beginning in 1928, based on his own field research. Both the historical and the 
linguistic study of the area since these foundations have been conditioned by the efforts of the 
rulers of Afghanistan from 1880 onwards to build and maintain a viable and cohesive political 
identity in the face not only of local centrifugal forces, but of first English, then Russian and 
more recently American interests. The centripetal force of an Afghan (or even, more narrowly, 
Pashtun) nationalism did not begin to emerge until a century ago, and has never become 
politically significant for all classes of the society throughout the country. As a result of the 
British interest in the area up to 1947, the Russian until 1917, the Soviet from 1917 to 1991 and 
American activities in the region since 1948, and especially since 1979, there is considerable 
variation among the various approaches of both Western and local scholars1. 
 
Geographical and Historical factors 
 
                                                
1 See in particular the chapters by Nawid, and by Hakala, this volume.  
 
 
In the study of the languages in and around Afghanistan we are dealing with language history 
and process on three scales: local communities; Persianate (or eastern-Islamic) civilization; and 
colonial, which has now merged into various post-colonial processes under the influence of 
globalization. The ways in which various factors deriving from each of these three scales of 
operation continue to interact makes Afghanistan a special case with regard to questions of 
language use. In what follows we introduce these scales and the way they impinge on each other. 
Readers without specialist knowledge of the area will find this information important as an 
introduction to the papers that follow. We hope that specialists will also find the statement 
useful. 
 
The Issue of National and Local identities Behind the languages we are studying lie political 
identities, modern states, and regional and international encumbrances that owe their current 
form, if not their existence, to the activities of the British and the Russians, or Soviets, since 
1800. But whereas the boundaries and language policies of the other states of Central and South 
Asia were established entirely by the British and the Russians or Soviets, the emergence of 
modern Afghanistan, and of its current hierarchy of languages, has a different history. (Only the 
history of Iran is comparable in this regard, and it is introduced briefly below.) It is a history not 
well understood, or easily accessible, and the experience of Afghanistan in the recent past has 
been seriously misunderstood as a result. 
 
Although the city of Ghazni, in the southeast of Afghanistan, had served as the base for a major 
imperial episode between 975 to 1187 AD, there was no historical precedent for a specifically 
local state of Afghanistan when the current state was established by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 
1747. The appearance of a new political entity of this type, with an ethnic or tribal identity, was 
without precedent in the Islamic world. Although the Ottoman Empire emerged from a Turkish 
tribal base at the end of the thirteenth centure, the Ottomans claimed to be leaders not of the 
Turks but of the Islamic world. Ahmad Shah claimed the title “King of the Afghans.” (We shall 
return below to the question of why he chose “Afghan” rather than “Pashtun.”) It is important to 
note also that this was still more than half a century before the arrival of any Western imperialist 
interests, let alone the influence of Western nationalism. When Elphinstone visited Ahmad 
Shah’s successor in Peshawar in 1809, the Afghan state had for fifty years been the largest 
empire in the region, having taken over the eastern territories of the Safavid (Iranian) Empire, 
and including within its territory not only Kashmir and most of what is now Pakistan, which it 
took from the Mughal Empire, but also large parts of what are now the Central Asian republics 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Very soon after this date, however, it imploded as a 
result of internecine strife among dynastic rivals. British power, which became a major factor in 
the area from 1840 onwards, complicated the situation. But British power needed Afghanistan as 
a buffer to Russian imperial interests, and was therefore careful to make sure that it did not 
finally disintegrate. 
 
It appears to have been the British who began to call it Afghanistan, probably in the upper 
corridors of the administration in Calcutta in the 1830’s. Before this time countries in the Islamic 
world did not have names. Boundaries were undefined. Areas that were culturally seen as having 
some sort of natural identity had names, such as Syria (Sham), Transoxiana (Ma vara’u’l-nahr), 
Sindh or Punjab, but political divisions seldom matched such natural areas. (Iran is an exception. 
Its origin lies with the Achaemenians. It came into use to identify a high culture before Islam, 
 
 
under the Sasanians, but it did not take on the narrower meaning of a political entity until the 
colonial period.) Afghanistan has never been coterminous with any such natural areas. 
Geographically, it is a quilted patchwork of mountain ranges, valleys and desert plains populated 
by isolated settlements and fluctuating populations of nomadic pastoralists, which had never 
experienced any form of cultural, linguistic, or political integration beyond what connected them 
to the trade routes (especially “the Silk Route”) that passed through the peripheries of the area 
and connected it to the cities of the larger Islamic world, China and India—to the north and south 
as well as the east and west. What became Afghanistan in 1747 had been borderland territory 
between the Safavid Empire in Isfahan to the west, the Mughal Empire in Delhi, and the Uzbek 
Khanates to the north. Qandahar, the first Afghan capital (1747-1776), had changed hands more 
than once between the Safavids and the Mughals. Herat, still one of Afghanistan’s four major 
cities, changed hands between the Safavids and the Uzbeks, and was part of Iran as late as 1863. 
Before the advent of Islam in the 7th century AD, the area had since the 6th century BC formed 
the eastern marches of the Iranian world (i.e. the world dominated by tribal populations speaking 
Iranian languages) containing the sites of much important Iranian cultural legend. What became 
Afghanistan in the 18th century had been a shatter zone between the major political centers of 
earlier history and sheltered refugee communities from all sides, including Mongols. 
 
In 1880 the British recruited a surviving collateral member of the Afghan royal family, Abdu’l-
Rahman Khan, from his exile north of the Oxus, and placed him on the throne in Kabul. He ruled 
for 21 years, and with the aid of methods that would have upstaged Draco (and created trouble 
for the British Indian Government when they reached the ears of Queen Victoria via her relatives 
in St. Petersburg) created the basis for a unitary nation-state in which all inhabitants, whatever 
their language, or cultural heritage, were persuaded to think of themselves first not only as 
Muslim but as Afghan. 
 
In 1893, just over half way through Abdu’l-Rahman’s reign, the British drew the boundary 
which would divide British India from Afghanistan. It was known as the Durand Line after Sir 
Mortimer Durand who was commissioned to draw it. The Durand Line ran through the middle of 
the territories that were then and now inhabited by Pashtuns. Neither Abdu’l-Rahman nor any of 
his successors ever ratified it, but they acquiesced in its imposition by the British. Since 1947 it 
has been a source of serious disagreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
Pashtuns (pronounced Pakhtun in eastern dialects), who in South Asian countries are known as 
Pathans, were known by others as Afghans—before Abdu’l-Rahman reworked this word as the 
national identity of all inhabitants of Afghanistan. Afghan is not a Pashto word. It is probably 
Persian in origin (cf. Morgenstierne 1979:28). This should not surprise us. Other tribal 
populations in the region are similarly known by blanket terms that may not be native to them, 
viz. Baluch, Kurd, which are Iranian in form, if not in origin.2 Over the past millennium Persian 
has been the language of literacy, either uniquely, or par excellence, throughout Central Asia and 
far beyond, in all directions. The man who created the new empire in 1747 that has now become 
the nation-state of Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani, was Pashtun, as were all his successors 
(save one short-lived usurper in 1929) down to the recently deceased Muhammad Zaher Shah. 
But his administration, like the administration of all surrounding states, was conducted in 
Persian. In 1776 his son and successor, Timur, moved his capital from Qandahar (which shares 
                                                
2 In English, after all, we call the Deutsche Germans, the Hellenoi Greeks, and we used to call the Iranians Persians. 
 
 
with only one other city, Ghazni, the distinction of being an entirely Pashtun city) out of Pashtun 
territory to Kabul. Kabul is located in eastern Afghanistan at the foot of a major pass that carries 
the historical trade route from India to central Asia over the ranges that extend the Hindu Kush 
into the Paropamisus and Koh-i Baba mountains—the ranges that separate the southern and 
northern halves of modern Afghanistan. From that date onwards, relations between the Pashtun 
dynasty that continued to rule and the plurality of Pashtun tribes has been ambivalent. Timur 
imported a non-Pashtun, Persian-speaking bureaucracy, and both the dynasty and its entourage 
became similarly Persian speaking. 
 
Pashtun nationalistic sentiments began to influence national policy in the 1930s. Starting around 
that time a small amount was added to the salaries of civil servants who passed a (not very 
demanding) examination in Pashto. In the constitution of 1964 Persian was named the ‘official’ 
language and Pashtu the ‘national language’. The name of the Persian language as used in 
Afghanistan was changed from Farsi (which means the language of the province of Fars in 
southwestern Iran, and has been the name in most common use throughout the eastern Islamic 
world over the past millennium) to Dari (which also has a long history, and means the language 
of the court). But not very much progress was made in the advancement of Pashto as a language 
of either speech or literacy outside the Pashtu-speaking tribes of the south and a few of the 
Pashtun colonies that Abdu’l-Rahman settled in the north. Since 1978, language has been further 
politicized. All of the languages of Afghanistan continue to be conditioned by the historical 
influence of Persian administrative and literary usage3. 
 
 
Larger Perspectives 
 
These historical trajectories illustrate some of the inter-ethnic problems behind the current 
language situation in Afghanistan and the region, but do nothing to explain the cultural status of 
Persian (generally known in Persian as farsi, but in Afghanistan since the constitution of 1964 as 
dari, and in Tajikistan since 1928 as tojiki). For this we must look at a much larger historical 
picture. 
 
The Persian language became a language of administration under the Achaemenian Empire 
between 559 and 321, in the form of Old Persian and written in cuneiform (Stolper and Tavernier 
2007). It went through a typical process of historical change and development as the language of 
administration in the succeeding Iranian Empires of the Parthians (247 BC-224 AD) and the 
Sasanians (224-651 AD), during which time it was known as Middle Persian or Pahlavi and 
written in a simplified form of the Aramaic script. It was then (in the middle of the 7th century) 
eclipsed for a period of two centuries following the Arab conquest that gradually integrated the 
region into a new Arab-Islamic empire. When it reemerged, as New Persian, in the middle of the 
9th century, it was written in the Arabic script, but it continued to symbolize the culture (and 
perhaps the remembered glory) of the pre-Islamic regal courts and administrations, especially 
their pomp and circumstance. Significantly, Persian reemerged not in what is now modern Iran, 
but in the cities in and around the northern and western borders of what is now Afghanistan. The 
implication for the modern non-Pashtun Afghan nationalist is to ask the question: which is the 
real successor state to the empires of Cyrus and Darius, of Ardashir and Anushirvan? Iran or 
                                                
3 See in particular the chapters by Nawid and by Hakala, this volume. 
 
 
Afghanistan? The state on the western side of what in western geography we call the Iranian 
Plateau has not been a strong empire with a great capital city since the Safavid dynasty (1501-
1722) ruled from Isfahan. The Safavid dynasty was destroyed by an invasion of Afghans! If 
events had played out only a little differently in the 19th century under the British (both in Iran 
and in Afghanistan) Afghanistan might now be known as Iran, and Iran might now be known by 
some other term, perhaps Kurdistan, or Baluchistan4, or another name which, like Afghanistan, 
would be derived from a tribal appellation.  
 
It is important to remember that none of these terms had any ethno-political significance before 
the late 19th century—only the memories of past power and glory, and military prowess. The 
ethno-political significance began to percolate into the area as a result of contact with Europe in 
the middle of the 19th century, and began to be important in Afghanistan in the 1920s. After the 
reemergence of Persian as the language of diplomacy, administration, and belles lettres in the 
courts of the power-centers that emerged in the early Islamic period (whose incumbents were 
now known as sultan) over eleven and a half centuries ago, and for trade between them, literacy 
became equated with Persian for all functions except those directly related to Islamic law and its 
interpretation. It did not matter what one’s native language was. All interaction that was for the 
record was either written in Persian, or (if the occasion called for oral interaction) spoken in 
Persian. This special function of Persian was facilitated by the memory of the authority and 
protocols of the earlier empires and at its greatest extent was valid in cities from as far west as 
Sarajevo under the Ottomans to the Takla Makan Basin under the Uzbeks and from the Turkic 
oases of Central Asia to the Nizams of Hyderabad in southern India. There are even records of 
wealthy young Venetians being sent to the Levant to study Persian in the 14th century. Persian 
was also used along the trade routes deep into central and eastern China under the Yuan dynasty, 
and has been taught at least intermittently in mosques in central China down to the present. 
 
Persian therefore worked as a koine (i.e. similar in function to Hellenistic Greek a millennium 
earlier), and was remarkable for its linguistic stability and standardization over a vast area from 
southeastern Europe to central China—which is obviously related to its high cultural value as the 
language of literacy among people most of whom did not speak it at home. Afghanistan was in 
the middle of this area. However, there was of course some change. Handwriting styles changed, 
and there were changes in preferred literary genres and in rhetorical style. Turkish, which in its 
Uzbek form had been a language of literacy, in various scripts in Central Asia, before it gave 
way to Persian, as the Saljuq Turks, the Mongols and later the Uzbeks converted to Islam and 
became the rulers of major power centers in the eastern Persianate world, finally in the 15th 
century began gradually to replace Persian in the west, albeit in a highly Persianized form, 
known as Ottoman Turkish, in the Arabic script. The next language to appear in writing was 
Pashto (again in the Arabic script) in the 16th century, but only for belles lettres. Urdu followed 
in north India, but had begun earlier in the Deccan. Then Sindhi began to be written, facilitated 
by the British. In 1837 Urdu was formally adopted by the British, in place of Persian, as the 
language of interaction between the Government (which from then on conducted its affairs in 
English) and the local population5. Other languages, like Balochi6 and the Dardic languages were 
still unwritten when Protestant Christian missionaries arrived in the late 19th century. But even 
                                                
4 See the article by Spooner on Balochi, this volume. 
5 The article by Diamond (this volume) is pertinent here. 
6 Spooner, this volume. 
 
 
though much has been written and printed in Balochi since the establishment of the Balochi 
Academy in Quetta in 1961, Baloch in Iran who were fully literate and well educated in Persian 
claimed they could not read books and newspapers printed in the Balochi. For them, reading 
meant reading Persian. In India Persian continued to be taught not only in traditional madrasas, 
but in modern schools, with a status comparable to Latin in England. It ceased to be a required 
subject in India and Pakistan in the early 1960s, about the same time that Latin ceased to be 
required for entrance into Oxbridge. 
 
There is no evidence that it ever occurred to Ahmad Shah, when he launched the new state in 
1747, that his administration should be conducted in the language of his own community, Pashto, 
even though Pashto had been a language of literacy to at least some degree for at least a century, 
probably more. When his son and successor Timur moved the capital to Kabul in 1776 he 
developed his bureaucracy with Persian-writing, Turkish-speaking Qizilbash left behind from 
Nader Shah’s Indian expedition in 1738, even though they were Shia. Both the interest in Pashto 
literacy and the growth of Pashtun nationalism were hampered by the political fragmentation of 
the Pashtuns that paradoxically had resulted from the establishment of a Pashtun dynasty. But the 
idea that Pashto should be used at least on an equal basis with Persian has been building since the 
1920’s, and it was included in the constitutions of 1933 and 1964. “In 1936 and in the 
constitution of 1964 it was reaffirmed that Pashto, alongside Dari, should function as an official 
language” (Miran 1977:1).  
 
